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ABSTRACT
McFarlan's IT Project Risk Assessment Framework (Applegate, et al.,
1996), identifies three main areas of IT project risk: project size, project
structure, and technology familiarity. According to this framework, if two IT
projects are of similar size, a project which is designed primarily around
emerging technologies will entail significantly higher risks than a project which is
designed primarily around traditional technologies. This paper analyzes two
comparably sized IT projects. One, a telemedicine initiative at Fletcher-Allen
Health Care in Vermont, is designed primarily around emerging technologies.
The other, the year 2000 compliance program at the New York Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA), is focused primarily on fixing and testing existing
systems on traditional platforms. Our assessment identified two additional
salient criteria which, when applied to the two projects revealed higher risks at
the MTA. These criteria are time constraints (i.e., the immovable deadline of the
year 2000) and system interdependence (i.e., the need for applications to share
data with other applications, both within the MTA and with numerous external
parties). When these two factors are taken into account, it becomes evident that
Year 2000 initiatives represent far higher project risks than the emerging
technology projects that are considered to be on the "bleeding edge."
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Many organizations, across a broad range of industries, currently face a
dual challenge:
•

With great fanfare, they enthusiastically launched strategic Internet
initiatives (such as electronic commerce and telemedicine); and

•

They reluctantly allocated significant resources to their Year 2000
(Y2K) compliance projects. This work is seen as a necessary condition
for survival, but offers little, if any strategic advantage.

An AICPA survey of "Top 10 Technology Issues," released in January,
1999, listed Y2K and the Internet as the two top technology issues for 1999,
based on their impact on revenue, organizational and personal productivity and
efficiency, and exposure to risk (AICPA, 1999).

The Internet represents a

significant strategic opportunity to forge new relationships with customers and
business partners as organizational and geographic boundaries dissolve
(Applegate and Gogan, 1995; Rayport and Sviokla, 1994). In health care,
Internet-based telemedicine is expected to transform how patient care is
delivered (Gallegos, 1998). Meanwhile, successful resolution of the Y2K
problem is critical to organizational survival, even though many senior
executives believe that their compliance effort is unlikely to yield strategic
advantages (Allen, 1998; Jenkins, 1997; Violino, 1997). Kappelman (1997)
reported that Fortune 500 organizations are allocating, on average, 30 percent
of their IS budget to Y2K compliance.
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Thus, many organizations are simultaneously managing both "strategic
opportunity" projects (such as telemedicine) and "necessary evil" projects (such
as Y2K compliance). This dual challenge is not merely a matter of resource
allocation. Since both kinds of initiatives may be large and complex (Applegate
and Gogan, 1995; Freeman and Meador, 1997), each requires careful risk
assessment and effective project planning and control.

Further, a common

framework for assessment would provide a tool for measuring and monitoring
riskiness across projects. In this paper, we consider risk to be a function of the
likelihood of failure and the consequences of failure; if likelihood and
consequences are both high, the project is highly risky.

An IT project risk assessment framework first proposed by McFarlan and
reported in Applegate, et al. (1996) notes that IT projects vary along three major
risk dimensions: project size, project structure, and familiarity with the
technology. Two categories representing the extremes of each dimension
illustrate the range of projects the framework encompasses.

Figure 1

summarizes the resulting eight risk categories based on the three dimensions
(the cells in bold characterize the two projects discussed in this paper).

This paper compares two large IT projects to assess the face validity of
this project risk assessment framework. One, aimed at a "strategic opportunity"
(Fletcher-Allen Health Care telemedicine initiative), appears to fall in the
Large/Unfamiliar Technology/Low Structure cell of Figure 1. The other, aimed at
a "necessary evil" (New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority year 2000
project), appears to fall in the Large/Familiar Technology/High Structure cell. As
we will discuss, the year 2000 project risks are far higher than those suggested
by this risk assessment framework. Two new risk dimensions become evident in
an analysis of this project. Each project is briefly described next, followed by an
overview of the McFarlan Project Risk Assessment Framework.
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Project Size

High Structure

Familiar
Technology

Low Structure

Small

lowest risk

Large

low risk

very low risk
(susceptible to
mismanagement)
low risk
(susceptible to
mismanagement)

Small

medium-low risk

high risk

Large

medium risk

highest risk

Unfamiliar
Technology

Source: Applegate, McFarlan, McKenney, 1996, p. 627

Figure 1. McFarlan's Project Risk Assessment Framework

II. METHODOLOGY
We report on longitudinal, field-based case studies at two non-profit
organizations: Fletcher-Allen Health Care in Burlington, Vermont and the New
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (with headquarters in New York City).

At Fletcher-Allen Health Care — Vermont's only tertiary-care teaching
hospital -- 13 field interviews were conducted, as follows:
•

In summer 1996, exploratory interviews were conducted with three
individuals: the CIO, a physician who was participating in an early pilot
test of a telemedicine system, and the technical coordinator of this
telemedicine initiative. The purpose of these interviews was to discover
the goals for the telemedicine initiative, project readiness, steps that had
been taken thus far, and anticipated implementation challenges.
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•

In spring 1997, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the CIO,
three physicians, two nurses, two technical specialists, and two patients.
These interviews were directed at reviewing the steps that had been
taken by that time to induce physicians at Fletcher Allen and at rural
hospitals and clinics in its catchment area to try to use the technologies
that had been made available to them. Interview questions were also
directed at identifying technical, organizational and other challenges that
had arisen in the early stages of this initiative.

At the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), the
following interviews were conducted:
•

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with five individuals from MTA
headquarters in fall 1996 and winter 1997.

•

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine individuals from
MTA's two largest operating agencies (New York City Transit Authority
and Long Island Rail Road) in fall 1996 and winter 1997.

•

In addition, documents associated with MTA and agency year 2000
initiatives were examined (including memoranda, Y2K project plans,
requests for proposals, and minutes of the MTA Inter-Agency Year 2000
Work Group from its inception in February 1995 through February 1997).
Two meetings of the Inter-Agency Year 2000 Work Group were also
observed.

Interview and meeting transcripts were produced from all of the datagathering efforts at FAHC and MTA, and these were augmented by an extensive
literature review on both organizations. Each case is briefly introduced below,
before analyzing them within the structure of the McFarlan framework.
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III. A STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY: FLETCHER-ALLEN HEALTH
CARE'S TELEMEDICINE INITIATIVE
Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC), Vermont's only tertiary-care teaching
hospital, is promoting video-conferencing and other telemedicine technologies in
its catchment area, consisting of Vermont and six New York counties. An
ambitious $30 million technology initiative was funded in 1996, with $17 million
allocated to enhancing Fletcher Allen's IT infrastructure and decision support
capabilities, and $13 million allocated to development of a regional telemedicine
network. In a case study about the initiative (Gogan and Guinan, 1997), the CIO
states that telemedicine will be critical to FAHC's successful transition to a
system of "capitation" (prepaid managed care) because it enables improved
services at reduced costs. In fall, 1997, the telemedicine project was at the pilot
stage, involving 15 remote sites. Usage statistics indicated that use of
telemedicine systems for continuing medical education was increasing, but
usage for medical consultations was declining slightly. In 1998, management
planned an ambitious roll-out of telemedicine stations (personal computers
equipped with video-conferencing cameras and software) to 600 physicians'
offices and additional remote sites, as well as the development of numerous
software applications.

IV. A NECESSARY EVIL: METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY'S YEAR 2000 PROJECT
Another case study (Gogan and Fedorowicz, 1998) describes the New
York Metropolitan Transportation Authority's (MTA) Y2K software compliance
projects from 1995 to 1997. The case notes: "If not fixed, the Year 2000 software
problem would give rise to a host of inaccuracies and various systems failures.
For MTA and its five semi-independent operating agencies, the cost to repair
systems was estimated at $25 to $30 million." The case describes how the five
Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
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agencies' IS departments worked with the MTA headquarters IS organization to
coordinate their planning, assessment, coding, and testing efforts (hereafter,
these four activities will be collectively referred to as “Y2K remediation”). The
largest agency, New York City Transit Authority, with 38,000 employees,
accounted for 65% of the total MTA budget. Its Y2K project was to involve
conversion of at least 11 million lines of code in 73 applications. The year 2000
project proposal for this agency stated that, if not rectified, the Y2K problem
could have serious impacts, including the following (a subset of their extensive
list):
•

“Revenue: Automated Fare Reporting and monthly posting process will be
disabled.

•

MSA Payroll: Inaccurate paychecks, due to incorrect age calculations,
causing deduction calculation errors...This will be a total nightmare.

•

Suspension: Inaccurate calculations of suspensions, with incorrect
paychecks.

•

Subway Signals: Automated scheduling of inspection and servicing for
signals and relays will not function. Calculation of last maintenance and
time between inspections will be inaccurate, as will maintenance history
reports. This will result in a less safe subway system, with more delays,
accidents, and lawsuits.

•

Track Walker Inspection: Time intervals between track inspections will be
calculated wrong. Management will have difficulty complying with
biweekly inspection of track, and will be unable to track substandard
conditions throughout the subway system. There will be a reduction in the
level of safety and in the state of repair.”

Thus, while Fletcher-Allen management saw the telemedicine project as
an important strategic opportunity to essentially invent new modes of quality

Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
8
Assessing Risks in Two Projects by J.L. Gogan, J. Fedorowicz, and A. Rao

healthcare, MTA management viewed the year 2000 projects as imperative, but
offering little value-added – i.e., a “necessary evil.”

The next section discusses the elements comprising McFarlan's IT Project
Assessment Framework, and the uses to which it is typically put.

V. McFARLAN'S IT PROJECT RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
IT projects (to modify, develop or acquire systems) range from small and
simple to large and complex. As discussed above, Applegate, McFarlan and
McKenney (1996) note that projects may be compared along three key
dimensions: project size, project structure (or degree of definition), and
experience with the necessary technologies. The questions in Figure 2 (below)
help managers identify project risks and measures to control risks.

Risk Dimension
Project Size

Key Questions
How much will it cost?
Expected work-hours?
Number of departments involved?
Estimated time to completion?
Can it be carved into smaller, manageable sub-projects?

Project Structure

Are the project inputs, outputs and data requirements clear?
What is the severity of expected user-department procedural changes?
What is the degree of needed organization structural changes needed?
How much do we have to build ourselves?
Can we buy some components off-the-shelf?
To what extent can structure be imposed on this project?

Experience
with the
Technology

Are the necessary hardware, software and network tools new to us?
If so, can we hire people who have the necessary expertise?
Do the vendor(s) involved have a track record with these technologies?

Figure 2. McFarlan's Risk Assessment Framework: Three Risk Dimensions
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The above-stated questions can help managers identify risks associated
with a particular project, and serve as a guide for the identification of possible
measures to reduce or control those risks. Since most IS organizations
simultaneously manage multiple initiatives, it is also considered prudent to
achieve a "balanced portfolio" of projects (ranging from small, simple, lowtechnology projects to large, complex, high-technology projects).

Thus, there are two complementary uses of the McFarlan framework:
•

An IS organization's "project portfolio" can be assessed according to
dimension-specific and over-all risk, leading to resource-allocation
decisions (including "pulling the plug" on projects if the over-all level of
risk is deemed untenable).

•

For each initiative, appropriate project management mechanisms can
be identified to address the specific risks in each of the three
categories.

"Strategic opportunity" projects (especially those involving emerging
technologies) typically entail higher risks than projects of similar size that involve
conventional technologies. The project team may not have experience working
with the necessary technologies, and/or the applicable vendors are not well
established and may not be viewed as reliable. In addition, the structure of
strategic opportunity projects typically emerges from prototypes, whereas
established projects have an existing structure to guide development efforts.
These observations would lead us to infer that the FAHC initiative entails higher
over-all risk than the MTA's year 2000 initiative. FAHC's telemedicine project
relies on widespread use of Web-based video-conferencing, which is not yet in
common use. In contrast, the MTA's systems are old, and many are being
retrofitted using software and hardware that has been in place for years.
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However, as we will explain, the MTA year 2000 project actually entails very high
project risks, which come most sharply into focus when two additional risk
dimensions are taken into consideration.

VI. RISK COMPARISONS
PROJECT SIZE
Each project has a budget of nearly $30 million, which would indicate that
they are of similar size. Other aspects of project size are noted in this section.

The Fletcher-Allen telemedicine initiative is a complex set of projects
involving numerous parties. The roll-out of video-conferencing stations is but an
early step toward a form of data-rich telemedicine in which caregivers on either
side of a medical consultation will have real-time access to a fully integrated
patient medical record. In fall 1997, only a handful of physicians and nurses
were involved with the telemedicine project. Half of eighteen clinical departments
had utilized telemedicine for at least one medical consultation, but only three
departments used it on a regular basis. In the 1998 rollout many more
caregivers, in several more departments, were to be brought into active
involvement, with an ultimate aim of involving the hospital's 250 resident
physicians, 380 medical students, and 380 nursing students.

The MTA initiative is also a complex set of projects involving numerous
parties (five agencies, software and hardware vendors, etc.). Thirty people
regularly attend meetings of the inter-agency work group, and report back to
teams in their agencies. The case suggests that this project is not unusually
large, compared with other MTA projects. For example, some 40 project
managers at New York City Transit Authority worked on 500 separate capital
improvement projects involving 4,300 employees. Several IS development
Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
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initiatives had $15 million price tags. However, the case also reports that the
MTA has been heavily criticized for ineffective project management in the recent
past. Hence, this organization may not, as yet, have developed the capacity to
learn from its extensive experience in managing large projects.

The FAHC and MTA projects both involve large numbers of target users.
The FAHC project can be managed in small deliverables (such as utilizing it in a
sub-set of medical specialties, or limiting the number of remote sites). MTA also
can identify each system to be made Y2K compliant as a small sub-project. We
will show in our later discussion that interdependence complicates dividing the
Y2K projects in this fashion.

But, we can say there are some limited

opportunities to sub-divide.

Over-all, the two projects seem comparable when compared on the
dimension of project size. The MTA project might be slightly more risky as there
are fewer opportunities to sub-divide the project.
PROJECT STRUCTURE
The goal of the FAHC project was quite open-ended: "to return to the
patient-centered, efficient values of the country doctor with the technology of the
21st century." The CIO envisioned giving caregivers and patients advanced
video-conferencing capabilities for "any time, any place" interactions. Some
project requirements were well-specified (e.g., FAHC campus network, video
conferencing architecture, Internet information access). Other elements (e.g.,
enhanced e-mail applications and an expert system effort) were not wellspecified. Once physicians are comfortable with video-conferencing, they will
want to have access to a patient's complete medical record during a
consultation. To that end, it was expected that an enterprise-wide Master
Medical Index would eventually be integrated with an enterprise-wide Patient
Data Repository, giving rise to an enormous data-integration challenge. The
Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
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CIO's expansive vision was far ahead of actual practice to date, creating the
potential for unrealistic expectations to be created in the minds of physicians or
administrators. This loosely defined project gives rise to a challenge to manage
constituents' expectations realistically.

The MTA project appears to have a clear goal: find and fix date-sensitive
code, using a systematic life-cycle approach consisting of the following steps:
inventory, assessment, conversion, testing, and migration. This approach would
suggest the project is highly structured. But a closer look reveals that in some
respects the project also suffered from a lack of clarity. In February 1997 the
MTA project scope was expanding significantly.

Some systems replacement

projects were behind schedule, forcing 5 million additional lines of code (in
systems that were originally slated to be replaced or retired) to be included in
the Y2K remediation effort. Management also began to recognize that end-user
computing would have to be addressed, as would processors embedded in
various devices (in elevators, climate-controls, and other equipment).

Both the FAHC and MTA projects suffer from a lack of clarity. At FAHC,
lack of clear definition leads to a risk of unrealistic expectations, which could
result in excessive project costs and delays in gaining the commitment of
necessary stakeholders (especially physicians located at remote sites). At MTA,
the risk was accentuated as management recognized the need to consider other
systems and embedded processors. We would estimate the risk at the MTA due
to project structure as being moderate while at FAHC the risk level would be
very high (since the telemedicine project is very loosely defined and structured).
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EXPERIENCE WITH THE TECHNOLOGY
At FAHC, many technologies must be harnessed for telemedicine to reach
its potential, including wide- and local-area networking, video-conferencing
equipment and software, expert systems, and data integration. Of these, data
integration is seen to represent the greatest technical risk. The case states that
FAHC's IT architecture was characterized by "incompatible administrative and
clinical systems, many of which utilized outdated technologies." The hospital's
clinical information systems are especially complex. The patient medical record
will need to be integrated with dozens of organizational units and laboratories
(e.g., radiology and pharmacy), to generate a correct bill, measure effectiveness
of care, and answer medical research questions. Ideally, all images from
radiology and elsewhere will be integrated with the patient record. Once
physicians are comfortable with video-conferencing, they will want to have online
access

to

the

patient's

complete

medical

record

during

telemedicine

consultations. Yet, the "holy grail" of a completely integrated online patient
medical record has yet to be fully achieved at any hospital, anywhere.

The telemedicine network itself represents a less complex challenge,
thanks to improved technologies for routing data among varied networks and
systems. FAHC's project has a movable target, from a platform perspective, in
that the project specifications are fluid enough to accommodate innovation as
new technologies are proven in and demanded by the marketplace.

For

example, the project is now moving to a Web-based video transmission platform.
Once each party has access to a high-speed network, the installation of videoconferencing capabilities is fairly straightforward, due to widely accepted
standard protocols for video communications and availability of relatively
inexpensive equipment. Fine-tuning network performance under varying demand
conditions will be a challenge, since physicians are not willing to use an
unreliable system when patient outcomes are at stake. However, the line
Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
14
Assessing Risks in Two Projects by J.L. Gogan, J. Fedorowicz, and A. Rao

capacity problem involves relatively simple issues in comparison with data
integration. Short term, it is only necessary to capture still or video images at
one site and transmit them without distortion to another. Long term, this
capability is to be integrated with the patient medical record and with diagnostic
expert systems.

Updating legacy systems at the MTA will not require the use of leadingedge technologies. However, many tools for identifying, converting, and testing
date-sensitive code are new to both the MTA and the market in general. The AllAgency Work Group is a useful mechanism by which the agencies and
headquarters shared information about these tools, and helped each other to
quickly identify, evaluate, select and utilize appropriate tools.

Usually, consideration of technology familiarity helps focus attention on
the challenge of utilizing leading-edge technologies in the face of a limited
supply of personnel who have experience with them. But, for many Year 2000
initiatives, the key issue is finding people who are experienced with the older
programming languages and operating systems that comprise many legacy
systems. A scarcity of COBOL programmers is a major concern. Furthermore, in
1997, under time pressure, they started to consider the use of a software
logic/windowing approach for date conversion1. The increased use of windowing
amplifies concerns about technology familiarity, since programmers must both
understand COBOL and have a relatively deep understanding of how an
application works (Fedorowicz and Gogan, 1997). The MTA is also using the
Year 2000 crisis as an opportunity to replace several older systems with new,
1

In “fixed-pivot windowing,” date-sensitive code is altered so that, when a call to a year field
yields a number greater than a pre-defined “pivot year,” the software returns a result preceded by
“19;” if the number is less than the pivot-point, the software returns a result preceded by “20.”
Thus, if a pivot year of 30 is set, then numbers less than 30 will be read as occurring in the
twenty-first century, and numbers 30 or greater will be interpreted as occurring in the twentieth
century. “Sliding pivot windowing” applies a different pivot-point depending on the system date.
For further explanation, see deJager and Bergeron, 1999; Fedorowicz and Gogan, 1997 and
Frankel and Gehr, 1997.
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state-of-the-art, client-server systems, for which they have no internal
development expertise. Thus, although at its outset it appeared that the year
2000 project would entail largely familiar technologies, actual experience
revealed several key areas of the project that involved unfamiliar technologies.

As summarized in Figure 3 (below), comparison of the two projects using
the McFarlan framework leads to the conclusion that, over-all, the two projects
entail rather similar risks, with Fletcher-Allen slightly higher over-all. Next, two
additional risk factors are discussed, which lead to a different conclusion.

Project
Size

Project
Structure

Technology
Familiarity

Fletcher-Allen
Large, but can be sub-divided into
smaller deliverables.

MTA
Large but getting larger, with fewer
opportunities to sub-divide.

Risk: Moderate

Risk: Moderate - High

CIO vision is very ambitious and openended, therefore loosely structured.
Danger of constituent backlash due to
unrealized expectations.

Project involves converting existing
systems, therefore a high degree of
structure. But scope is expanding
rapidly, and fundamental assumptions
are challenged (e.g., expansion versus
windowing, replace versus remediate).

Risk: Very High

Risk: Moderate

Although
new
to
FAHC,
the
technologies required for the first phase
are known and manageable. Subsequently, multimedia data integration
technologies will represent very high
risk.

Project primarily involves converting
old systems, but a shortage of COBOL
programmers raises risk. Automated
Y2K tools, while not complex, are new.
Project success also hinges on
successful completion of replacement
projects, which are based on new
client/server technologies.

Risk: In 1998 and 1999, Moderate;
in 2000 and later, Very High

Risk: High

Figure 3.Comparison of Project Risks based on the McFarlan Framework
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TIME AND INTERDEPENDENCE
Two dimensions that significantly raise the level of project risk faced by
the MTA are time and interdependence.

These risks are not specifically

considered in the McFarlan framework but they impact each dimension he
outlined.

Time constraint: The MTA Y2K project is time dependent.

Since all

systems have to be compliant by 2000, the MTA has to inventory all of its
existing systems and determine those that need to be made compliant. While
they knew of problems with embedded processor chips, they couldn't determine
the number that had to be fixed until they started to test. The result: a large
project that is getting larger.

In addition to impacting the project size, the immovable deadline adds
complexity to the project structure. Systems developers often try to avoid "scope
creep" by deferring requests for added functionality. In Y2K projects, however,
the scope must be allowed to expand in order to avoid date-related systems
failures that might arise within the organization's own portfolio of systems, as
well as within systems of other parties with whom data are exchanged (see
“Interdependence,” below). The only other viable option is to discontinue the
function or service that is supported by a non-compliant system.

The time constraint also forces the MTA to use subcontractors for some of
the work.

For an enterprise that relied primarily on internal systems

development and maintenance resources, building the capability to manage an
external workforce is a significant challenge.

Time constraints can also affect project structure because of the necessity
to utilize a methodology different than what had been planned. In the case of
Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
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MTA this was evidenced as a change from the initial plan to use a “date field
expansion” conversion methodology (expand date fields from two digits to four
digits). As noted above, in 1997, under time pressure, they started to use
“windowing” for date conversion.

One might argue that the severe time constraint gave the MTA
organization a sharp focus on the Y2K project, and caused them to defer other,
lower-priority projects. Although this did happen, the Y2K problem was also used
as a rationale to accelerate work on several new systems development projects.
The high estimated costs of fixing several large outdated systems led
management to decide to replace them instead with new client-server systems
that would already be Y2K-compliant. While it made sense to upgrade to newer
technology, these client-server development projects were also large and
complex, and (as could have been predicted by the McFarlan model) several of
them fell behind schedule. Absent a time constraint, these replacement projects
could have been allowed to continue. Instead, recognizing that the replacement
projects might not be completed by the end of 1999, management had to "bite
the bullet" and require that the existing systems undergo Y2K remediation as
well, even though it was expected that some time in 2000 they would be
replaced by the client-server systems.

At Fletcher-Allen Health Care, there was no particular time constraint on
the telemedicine project, and this worked in their favor. Telemedicine
consultations are not covered under current insurance reimbursement plans, so
consulting physicians taking part in the prototyping phase are essentially
volunteering their time where the patient is otherwise covered by today's
insurance plans (the physician at the remote hospital, where the patient is,
would be reimbursed. The physician at Fletcher-Allen, who provides the
telemedicine consultation, would not be reimbursed.) Eventually, reimbursement
is expected to move to a capitation-based scheme, under which the amount of
Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
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reimbursement will depend on the number of participating subscribers, not on
the specific services provided. Telemedicine provides an inexpensive method of
reaching remote areas, and thus is consistent with capitation economics.
However, because the transition to capitation is taking place more slowly than
originally expected, delays in system implementation may actually result in
higher participation interest once the system is fully operational. Technology
options also improve as the telemedicine project extends later into the future,
and the costs of leading-edge technologies will decrease as well.

Thus, time delays may actually work to Fletcher-Allen’s favor. The
telemedicine initiative as defined by the current project manager will be
“completed” once all designated remote sites are engaging in telemedicinebased applications with Fletcher-Allen physicians on a regular basis. It appears
that this goal will be reached by the end of 1999 or early 2000. On the other
hand, one can argue that the lack of a time constraint can also lead to a lack of
management discipline regarding project focus. As was noted above, the CIO
articulated quite an expansive vision for future applications of telemedicine. Over
time, this vision can lead to extensive scope creep, which in turn can lead to
excessive consumption of project resources, with few tangible benefits. Thus,
subsequent telemedicine projects based on the CIO’s vision of “any time, any
place” medical care, supported by a fully integrated patient record and
sophisticated knowledge-based software tools, stands a great risk of never
being fully completed, if lax management discipline allows scope creep to
accompany a flexible deadline.

Interdependence.

As companies have developed systems and

connected them to other systems within the company and outside there has
been a growing interdependence. Interdependence greatly adds to the
complexity of the Y2K project. An approach used to reduce project size is to
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defer non-critical functions. As the MTA tried to identify systems that could be
deferred, they found interdependencies that limited their options.

Interdependencies also make it more difficult to carve up projects into
smaller sub-projects. Since the date-sensitive output of one MTA system had to
feed another it became important to perform Y2K remediation in appropriate
sequence and with consistent technology. In addition to testing each system by
itself, extensive end-to-end testing had to be done across all interrelated
systems.

Perhaps most risky to the MTA was the dependence on outside suppliers.
After checking if outside suppliers of information, software, hardware, and
services intended to become Y2K- compliant, the MTA would have to check if
those systems were indeed compliant when connected to those of the MTA.
Many suppliers claimed they would be compliant by mid to late 1999.

This

places tremendous stress on the project structure as end-to-end testing and
debugging of these large interrelated systems will have to be done close to the
deadline.

Interdependence also had a significant impact on the underlying
technology. With no interdependence a system can be taken off line, fixed and
tested, then synchronized to make its data base consistent with transactions that
may have occurred during the time it was off line.

Because of extensive

interdependence, the MTA systems cannot be simply taken off line; they need to
continue functioning with links to other systems. Therefore, software "bridges"
had to be constructed and later dismantled.

Another example of interdependence affecting technology occurs when a
system has been working for years on an old computer with its old operating
system.

The manufacturer of that hardware and software typically converts
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systems to make its new equipment Y2K compliant but would decline to upgrade
the old. The MTA then had to adopt the new version of the technology and
rewrite their systems to be compliant with it. In several instances, the MTA had
to undergo multiple upgrade installations to “catch up” to the Y2K-compliant
version.

Altogether, this myriad collection of interdependencies increases the risk
factor of completing the project successfully, completely, and on time.

Thus, two additional factors seem to amplify the risks of managing this
very large project at the MTA: a severe time constraint and a high degree of
systems interdependence. In contrast, these two factors are in far less evidence
at FAHC, initially, although the risk of systems interdependence is likely to
increase sharply at FAHC in later phases of the telemedicine project.

The early phase of the FAHC project (which was the subject of the current
study) incorporates videoconferencing over the Internet.

This phase of the

project relies on existing open protocols that greatly simplify the interchange
problem, so that interchange risk at this stage is low. A second phase of the
project will entail adding images to the shared data.

The imaging system

employed for this level of sharing also involves a low level of risk, as a common
imaging system will be adopted for use at the remote sites. The project received
a grant that covers the cost of these systems, allowing image sending and
receiving organizations to employ a common technology base.

The only

exception to the use of standardized imaging systems will be when specialized
equipment may need to be added to the common configuration, which will be a
rare accommodation.

A later phase of the FAHC telemedicine project (post-2000) will depend
on implementing a common data structure that integrates medical and
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administrative data. Integration will entail very high risk in the long term, both
because no medical facility has ever succeeded in this, and because the FAHC
data must match across all organizations involved in the telemedicine activities.
This system cannot be rolled out as a prototype because a great deal of
planning and data cleansing will be necessary before it can be adopted. This
activity must succeed immediately upon implementation, and carries very risky
consequences if it does not work.

VII. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
Managers are intimately familiar with the risk-vs.-return tradeoff on
which feasibility studies depend. Many managers, and researchers alike, focus
on the expected return of projects, ignoring or overlooking the importance of a
significant risk assessment. Riskiness is less measurable than return, so that
many project studies underplay this aspect of decision making.

A risk

assessment framework -- like the modified McFarlan framework which is
proposed in Figure 4 -- would provide a valuable evaluative and comparative
tool for examining individual and portfolios of projects.
TIME CONSTRAINT
By definition, all year 2000 projects are time-dependent (except in the
very few organizations where the threat of Y2K failures was identified and
resolved early). Although a tight deadline can have a positive effect (by forcing
an organization-wide focus on priorities and by reallocating resources away from
lower-priority projects to the Year 2000 project), this study demonstrates several
ways in which the immovable deadline increased Y2K project risks. For the MTA,
system performance and cost considerations were forced to take a back seat to
scheduling, as the deadline drew near. Thus, MTA management had to decide
to utilize a windowing approach for much of the date conversion, even though
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Project
Size

Project
Structure

Technology
Familiarity

Time Constraint

Fletcher-Allen
Large, but can be sub-divided into
smaller deliverables.

MTA
Large but getting larger, with fewer
opportunities to sub-divide.

Risk: Moderate

Risk: Moderate - High

CIO vision is very ambitious and
open-ended, therefore loosely
structured.
Danger of constituent backlash
due to unrealized expectations.

Project involves fixing existing systems,
therefore high degree of structure. But
scope
is
expanding
rapidly,
and
fundamental assumptions are challenged
(e.g., expansion vs. windowing, replace
vs. remediate).

Risk: Very High

Risk: Moderate

Although new to FAHC, the
technologies required for the first
phase are known and manageable.
Subsequently, multimedia data
integration technologies will represent very high risk.

Project primarily involves fixing old
systems, but a shortage of COBOL
programmers raises risk.
Automated Y2K tools, while not complex,
are new. Project success also hinges on
successful completion of replacement
projects, which are based on new client/
server technologies.

Risk: In 1998 and 1999, Moderate
In 2000 and later, Very High

Risk: High

Iterative prototype approach is
flexible. Longer timeframe has
financial benefits, although scopecreep could arise.

Immovable deadline vies with scope
creep. Methodology and staffing changes
result.

Risk: Low
Risk: Very High
Interdependence

Phase in of prototype does not
need to be linked. However, the
level of data integration that is
planned for later phases (200x)
has never been successfully
achieved elsewhere.

Delays in replacement project schedules
increase scope of existing system remediation.
Reliance on external links and embedded
systems require software bridges and
timetable adjustments.

Risk: In 1998 and 1999, Low
In 2000 and later, Very High

Risk: Very High

Figure 4. Proposed Five Factor Comparison of Project Risks
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expansion would have been preferable had time pressure not been a factor.
MTA management also had to make difficult choices to fix older systems that
were scheduled to be replaced by client-server systems (strategic development
projects that had fallen behind schedule). Euro conversion projects face a similar
set of challenges, although the phase-in of the Euro provides for a somewhat
more flexible deadline (electronic transactions began in 2000, but full cash
currency conversion does not go into effect until 2002).

In contrast to the MTA, at FAHC scheduling was given a lower priority
than achieving a high-performing, reliable system. While the use of telemedicine
applications was seen as a desirable means to enhance patient care, a delay of
six months, a year or more would not have serious consequences.

From this discussion, we observe that a time constraint can affect
different types of project risk. An immovable deadline increases the risks of
grave consequences to the organization if the project is not completed on time.
However, a deadline can sometimes be used to good effect if management
chooses to respond with discipline in resource allocation and focused attention.

Where there is no time constraint, by definition there is very little risk that
the organization will face grave consequences if the project is delivered late.
However, the lack of a time constraint can cause problems if management allows
unnecessary scope creep, which increases the risk of poor project productivity
(i.e., overspending, with few concrete deliverables, resulting in a poor ratio of
project benefits to project costs).

Thus, we conclude that time constraint does increase project risk, yet
(somewhat paradoxically), risk can be reduced by using the time constraint as a
way to justify increased project management discipline and focus. Furthermore,
the lack of a time constraint reduces the risk of adverse consequences due to
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late project completion, yet (again paradoxically), if management allows a
relaxed deadline to lead to scope creep, then having “too much time” can
increase the risk of poor project productivity.
INTERDEPENDENCE
Adding to MTA project complexity was the extent to which date-sensitive
data flowed to and from systems within the MTA, its five agencies, and a host of
external parties (including banks, insurance companies, regulators, and various
service providers). Indeed, all year 2000 compliance projects, Euro conversion
programs, and other highly synchronized systems conversions efforts, entail
similarly

extensive

interdependence,

both

among

systems

within

an

organization's application portfolio, and with third parties. Since other parties
may have different priorities, it is difficult to coordinate the scheduling of
conversion and testing activities across multiple activities. For example, if
different parties make different choices about their specific Y2K conversion
approach (e.g., expansion versus windowing; or windowing with a different pivotpoint), then an extra layer of activities, coordination, and documentation must be
imposed because "bridging" software must be written to convert output from one
application into an input that can be interpreted by another.

At Fletcher-Allen Health Care, the specific telemedicine project studied in
this

report

involved

telemedicine-related

only
projects

moderate
will

most

interdependence;
likely

involve

however,
extensive

future
system

interdependence (particularly in the full integration of a multimedia online patient
record). Like the MTA, the data integration of future Fletcher-Allen projects
mandates that all involved systems be fully synchronized and work correctly at
the time they are released for use. Management will have to freeze changes to
such a system for some months prior to the actual conversion to assure that all
components are functioning properly as separate units and as a cohesive
system. Supplier and customer (or at FAHC, physician offices') systems are also
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important to these efforts, and all bridges or other connections must work
correctly at the time of cut-over.

Interdependence also gives rise to a need to incorporate extensive
contingency planning into time-constrained projects like year 2000 and Euro
conversion projects. Given the project risks discussed above, it is prudent to
prepare for various types of failure.

Programmatic contingency planning

addresses issues that need to be resolved when a project experiences schedule
slippage, while operational contingency planning addresses various business
process interruption scenarios which could occur if the root problem (such as the
Y2K bug) is not completely eradicated. Well-designed and tested contingency
plans represent a significant project management challenge on their own. With
time-bound projects, especially those entailing high system interdependence,
contingency planning must occur in parallel with the focal project activities.
Parallel operation, in turn, exacerbates the already formidable challenges of
resource-allocation and management attention. Projects that are less timeconstrained and involve less interdependence benefit from both a lower need for
contingency planning (especially programmatic contingency planning) and the
luxury of doing operational contingency planning late in the project life cycle.

Most organizations do not have the luxury of focusing on a single system
development project at a time. Instead, projects begin and end continually, and
project assessments must take into account the likelihood of other projects
competing for resources, including time and user expertise. A framework such
as that provided in Figure 4 gives I/S managers a tool to examine a portfolio of
projects collectively, to gauge the aggregated risks of an entire set of proposed
and ongoing activities.

This approach provides a means of justifying the

occasional high risk project that has some expectation of high returns, but would
not qualify for investment on its own. The framework, as it stands, must be

Communications of AIS Volume 1, Article 15
26
Assessing Risks in Two Projects by J.L. Gogan, J. Fedorowicz, and A. Rao

further refined to provide detailed guidance for its use as a measurement tool.
Research to further this end is prescribed in the concluding section below.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Case studies are undertaken to illustrate the complexity of real situations
studied within a theoretical framework.

Multiple-case studies can serve the

same purpose as multiple experiments. Yin (1989, p. 54) explains:

"An important step is the development of a rich, theoretical
framework. The framework needs to state the conditions under which a
particular phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal replication) as well
as the conditions where it is not likely to be found (a theoretical
replication). The theoretical framework later becomes the vehicle for
generalizing to new cases, again similar to the role played in crossexperiment designs. Furthermore, just as with experimental science, if
some of the empirical cases do not work as predicted, modification must
be made to the theory."

In this study, the McFarlan framework predicted that the FAHC "strategic
opportunity" telemedicine initiative would entail higher project risk than the MTA
"necessary evil" year 2000 compliance projects. Application of the McFarlan IT
project risk assessment framework usually points to the conclusion that (when
controlled for project size), emerging technologies projects entail the highest
risks.

However, comparative analysis of these two cases reveals that two

heretofore-unacknowledged

elements

—

time

constraints

and

systems

interdependence — appear to contribute to a higher degree of project risk at the
MTA. The "necessary evil" of year 2000 compliance may well represent the
highest-risk initiatives that IS organizations will manage as this century draws to
a close, claiming the lion's share of IS resources and attention. In contrast, many
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emerging technology projects do not suffer from an immovable deadline, and
many do not depend heavily on coordination with external parties.

Thus, it appears that the McFarlan project risk framework can be
enhanced through the addition of two new risk elements — time constraint and
system interdependence. Further research is needed to validate these elements,
as well as to more clearly identify the specific factor components defining both
these new elements and the original three elements of size, structure, and
technology familiarity. Further case-based research is needed to reveal
measures that project managers have used to cope successfully with the risks
posed by time constraints and interdependence in other year 2000 compliance
projects as well as in other large IT initiatives.

Our assessment of the two new risk factors also helped to reveal a lack of
clarity in the relationship between particular risk factors and the adverse
outcomes that project managers are seeking to avoid. We observed that the Y2K
time constraint raised the risks that the MTA project would not be completed on
time, which could lead to severe consequences (in terms of public safety,
employee morale and other outcomes). Yet, we also speculated that the lack of
a time constraint at Fletcher-Allen could lead to scope creep (i.e., exacerbate the
telemedicine project’s loose structure), leading to excessive costs and
disappointing returns. Further research is needed to address the relationships
among specific project risk factors and with specific outcomes.

Survey-based research across a broad range of projects and contexts will
be required in order to isolate the features comprising all five risk elements, with
two aims:
1. development of a reliable and valid project risk diagnostic instrument
and
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2. investigation of the relative importance of each risk element in
determining over-all project risk.

McFarlan (1982) proposed a set of 42 questions that could be evaluated
and weighted to produce a numeric risk assessment. These questions need to
be reexamined and analyzed statistically, to ascertain their grouping into the five
elements discussed here. It is highly likely that some questions need to be
updated or replaced due to technological advances. It is also probable that the
questions will group across the five factors we propose instead of the three in
the original framework, as questions pertaining to timing and interdependence
link to these new factors.

Note that, in laying claim to these two new risk factors, we cannot propose
that all existing sources of risk have now been identified. Further research is
needed, across a broad range of organizational contexts and types of IT
projects, to identify other measurable risk factors that cannot be accommodated
under the five-factor umbrella. For example, one broad factor that comes readily
to mind might be labeled “organizational readiness.” Weak senior management
support, lack of prior experience in managing complex projects, and low
employee morale may constitute elements of this risk factor.

Finally, similar in-depth case analysis should be undertaken to compare
and contrast the application of the five-factor framework with other risk
management approaches. Lyytinen et al. (1998) analyze the similarities and
differences among four risk frameworks, but do not provide any empirical
demonstration of their relative use. We have demonstrated the application of
one framework, and suggest that a productive next step would be to conduct
similar assessments across frameworks to test the Lyytinen et al. conclusions.
Editor’s Note: This article was fully refereed. It was received on November 6, 1998. It was with
the authors for approximately two months for two revisions. It was published on May 5, 1999
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